1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:08-cr-10309-MLW-1
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5	INTER CHARGO OF AMERICA
6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
7	VS.
8	MICHELLE ROBINSON
9	MICHELLE ROBINSON
10	
11	* * * * * *
12	For hearing before:
13	Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf
14	
15	Plea Change and Sentencing Hearing
16	
17	United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston.)
18	One Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts 02210
19	Friday, February 20, 2009
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22	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
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PROCEEDINGS

(Begins, 2:30 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Criminal Matter 08-10309, United States versus Michelle Robinson. The Court is in session. You may be seated.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Would counsel please identify themselves for the Court and for the record.

MR. DOWDEN: Good afternoon, your Honor.

James Dowden on behalf of the United States and I'm

joined today with Paul Levenson, also, with the United

States.

THE COURT: Mr. Dowden, you're going to have to speak into the microphone and keep your voice up, please.

MR. DOWDEN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Good afternoon, your Honor. Mark Smith for Michelle Robinson.

THE COURT: Since this is the first time I've seen you, I'd like to try to assure that we have a clear and common sense of where we are and where you hope to go.

As I understand it, Miss Robinson was arrested on August 13, 2008 and detained in Federal custody. At some point she represented that she was indigent, that

she had no income or assets, and Mr. Smith was appointed as Criminal Justice Act counsel to represent her.

Although it's not quite clear to me how it took until August 1, 2008 for her to be charged, on that date she was charged in a one-count information alleging that she used threats in interstate commerce in violation of 18

United States Code, Section 875D, and there are forfeiture allegations pursuant to the relevant statutory provisions.

On October 29, 2008, the grand jury returned a three-count indictment asserting the 875D charge that was in the information and adding two related charges of wire fraud in violation of Section 1343. The indictment also has the forfeiture allegations in it.

On January 21, 2009, the defendant moved for the preparation of a pre-plea presentence report. I was informed that the parties had entered into a binding plea agreement on January 9, that is, an agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C). That's a kind of agreement that I have to either accept and impose the agreed-upon sentence or reject and give the defendant a chance to withdraw her plea. The binding plea agreement provides for 6 months in custody, which I was told would expire on February 13, 2009. I was asked to conduct this hearing before then.

The plea agreement would also require the imposition of a 3-year term of supervised release with the first 6 months in home detention. This can be clarified in the course of the proceeding, but I assume that that could be home detention on electronic monitoring, if appropriate. In addition, it would require, as a condition of supervised release, that Miss Robinson not publicize the name of the victim of her extortionate scheme.

The government, I was told, agreed with the defendant that it was appropriate to proceed in this fashion, so the day after the motion was filed on January 22, I allowed it and I scheduled this hearing for today, which appeared to be the earliest date that Probation could prepare the presentence report and give me and you a short period of time to study it intensely, which I've done.

In my order, on January 22, I set a schedule for the filing of any pretrial memos or other information not in the presentence report, the contemplated filing by February 6th. No filings were made and two days ago I ordered that sentencing memos be filed, at least by the government.

Today I ordered that the financial statement of the plea agreement provided would be given to the

government to be filed with me under seal. I did that because the defendant had not supplied a complete financial statement to the Probation Office, rather she referenced the fact that she would provide one to the U.S. Attorney.

I wanted those filings so I could put myself in the best position to make a properly-informed judgment promptly, which is what you're asking me to do, and I have studied everything very closely. The memos were filed. The defendant objects to the calculation of the presentence report.

The financial statement that I received this morning from the government and some supplementary information relating to the financial statement that was given to Probation that the defendant filed, I put under seal, because that's the type of information that ordinarily comes in the presentence report and is received under seal. I expect we're going to be discussing it. I have questions rooted in the financial statement reports. The discussion will occur in open court.

But -- and in addition, I guess I should note, that within the hour Probation provided me, and I hope already to you, a memo reviewing and revising the calculations, or the guideline range essentially,

getting at the range advocated by the parties, although by a different route, a 27 to 33 month range instead of a 33 to 41 month range.

But in terms of the background and where we are at the moment, is that a reasonable and reliable summary or is there something else I should have in mind?

MR. DOWDEN: Nothing else, your Honor, from the Government.

MR. SMITH: We would agree with that summary, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, as I said, what I -- well, actually I didn't say it. There's a threshold issue that needs to be addressed.

I did order this expedited preparation of the presentence report, but Rule 32(e)(2) requires the disclosure of a presentence report to the defendant 35 days before sentencing unless the defendant waives the minimum period. Rule 32(f)(1) requires objections be filed 14 days after that and Rule 32(g) requires disclosure of the report seven days before sentencing. None of those things were done because the motion for the pre-plea presentence report and the sentencing was made less than 35 days before the requested sentencing date.

So, Mr. Smith, I need to know whether Ms. Robinson

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wants to waive those time periods and, if so, I'll ask
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     her a few questions. If you want to describe what all
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     of this means to her, why don't you take a minute or
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     two.
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                MR. SMITH: It will just take a minute, your
 6
     Honor.
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                THE COURT:
                            Sure.
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                (Pause.)
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                MR. SMITH: Thank you, your Honor. I've
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     explained it to my client and she'll answer any
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     questions you have.
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                THE COURT: All right. Ms. Robinson, please
     stand and be sworn.
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                (THE DEFENDANT, sworn.)
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                THE COURT: You may be seated.
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                (Is seated.)
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                THE COURT: Here, why don't you pull that
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     microphone up to try to assure that I can hear you.
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           Would you please state your true full name?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Michelle Shanae Robinson.
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                THE COURT: You're going to have to speak more
22
     loudly.
23
                THE DEFENDANT: Michelle Shanae Robinson.
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                THE COURT: Do you understand that you've just
25
     taken an oath to answer the questions I'm going to ask
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1 you truthfully? 2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Do you know that -- with regard to all the questions I'm going to ask you today, if you 4 5 give me a false answer, that could be a separate, prosecutable criminal offense? 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 8 THE COURT: Do you understand that if you're confused by any of my questions or unsure about what an 9 10 honest and accurate answer would be, I'll give you a 11 chance to speak to Mr. Smith, so we can clear up any 12 confusion and you can give me a reliable response? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 13 14 THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that 15 I've been told that you want to plead guilty and have me 16 sentence you today to the sentence that you and the 17 government agree to in the plea agreement? 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 19 THE COURT: And do you understand that, among 20 other things, that sentence calls for 6 months in jail or prison that may be a time period you've already 21 22 served? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: Do you understand that under the rules a presentence report had to be prepared before I 25

could sentence you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that I was asked to have that presentence report prepared even before you pled guilty on about January 21st of this year?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ordinarily you have a right to get that report 35 days before the sentencing date and then there's a period of time for objections to be made, for Probation to respond?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that you and your attorney didn't get this report 35 days in advance, you only got it a couple of days ago because that's when it was prepared?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that usually it takes about 12 weeks to go through the whole presentence report process, but it was all done faster, so if I'm persuaded to impose the sentence you and the government agreed upon, you can get out sooner rather than later?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you talked with Mr. Smith about whether you want to give up your right to have had that presentence report 35 days in advance of the sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with his work as your lawyer in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you want to give up your right to have that presentence report 30 days in advance of the date I sentence you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Well, I find that Ms. Robinson is competent, that she's acting knowingly and voluntarily, that she's effectively represented, therefore I accept her waiver under Rule 32(e)(2).

Now, before we move to some other things, I want to see if I accurately understand the key features of the binding plea agreement, since to some extent I have to question the defendant about it.

Since it's a binding plea agreement, what I intend to do is conduct a Rule 11 colloquy. At the end of that I'll decide whether to accept the plea. I will, however, defer a decision on accepting the plea agreement until after we have essentially the sentencing

hearing, which will follow the Rule 11 colloquy, and in that sentencing hearing, I will decide whether to accept the plea agreement and impose the agreed-upon sentence or reject it and give Miss Robinson an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea, if I previously accepted it.

Do the parties agree that that's an appropriate way to proceed?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ DOWDEN: No objection from the Government, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, I do have some questions about the plea agreement. The plea agreement calls upon me to dismiss Count 1, which is the alleged threat in violation of Section 875(d).

What's the reason for dismissing Count 1?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, as we've outlined in our sentencing memo with the Court, the Government believed the totality of its recommended sentence, including its provisions of supervised release --

THE COURT: You're going to have to speak more

MR. DOWDEN: Including its provisions of supervised release, its period of incarceration, the restitution, and the other provisions provide, in totality, a reasonable sentence. In coming to that

reasonable sentence, the parties engaged in negotiations, plea negotiations, and as part of those negotiations, the Government agreed to dismiss Count 1 and pursue Counts 2 and 3.

THE COURT: Did you think that that had some impact on the guideline range?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, it certainly -- the Government does not -- does not believe that the wire fraud charges would have been different had it not dismissed Count 1 of the indictment.

THE COURT: But if Count 1 was in the indictment, would the guidelines be higher?

MR. DOWDEN: No, your Honor, the Government does not believe as such. And, also, the Government believes that the wire fraud charges encapsulate the core of the conduct found in Count 1, and that is part of the reason why the Government agreed to dismiss Count 1. It's part of the fraudulent scheme alleged in the wire fraud counts, your Honor. It was a scheme to defraud by injuring the reputation of the addressee by fraudulent misrepresentations.

THE COURT: Because this is going so fast and
I'm trying to accommodate you, it's actually my sense
that if Count 1 -- and it may not be probation. If
Count 1 remained in, it might be appropriate -- it would

be appropriate to use the higher loss amount, the 580 instead of the 280, which would have raised the guideline range from 33 to 41. But it's my present sense, also, that that's not material. It's an overlapping range, 33 months is in that range, and the departure or variance you're advocating is either going to be reasonable under either of those ranges or not reasonable, but the precise calculation is not material.

MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor, I agree with that. And as part of the parties plea agreement, there was an agreement of the calculation of the guideline sentence, and although probation has disagreed with it on two occasions, I think they do now agree that ultimately the calculation that -- that the range is the same to get to the --

THE COURT: Well, they agree that the range for Counts 2 and 3 is as you calculated. They may get to it by a different route. But I think the range might be higher if Count 1 were still in.

MR. DOWDEN: I agree, your Honor. I do agree.

THE COURT: Okay. And then, as I said in the order that I issued yesterday, as a condition of supervised release, I'm being asked to order that Miss Robinson not publicize the identity of the victim. And I don't issue orders I don't expect to be obeyed. And I

don't issue orders that I think are ambiguous and might arguably be reasonably misunderstood. And to me, the term "publicized," without some explanation or clarification may be ambiguous.

As I said in the order that I issued yesterday, I assume that I'm -- if I accept this agreement, that I am to order Miss Robinson not to disclose the identity of the victim in the future to anybody, except her attorney and somebody working with him, anybody working with him in connection with this case. Is that what you intended?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, as to the definition of the term "publicize" in your order, the Government agrees with your definition of "publicize" in this context, yes.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Smith, is that an acceptable definition of "publicize" for the purpose of this case?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then we'll discuss this perhaps in more detail later. But I put you on notice yesterday that I was thinking -- and I'm concerned about what happens if the victim's name gets revealed to the media. And I've ordered Miss Smith not to -- not Miss Smith, Miss Robinson, not to disclose it.

There's a certain dynamic that I have some familiarity with that usually ensues and the person charged with the improper disclosure may well say, "Well, a number of people knew this name and it wasn't me who told the media." And the Attorney General usually doesn't authorize the Justice Department to subpoena a member of the media to find his or her source, so we look for the source here in court.

It would be helpful, I think, to perhaps avert any problems in the future, but to put the Court in a position to resolve the issues quickly and fairly since, if that issue comes up, it could result in Miss Robinson going to prison for three years and then being on supervised release again.

If I learn, under seal, and I may not even bother to look at it, it wouldn't affect any decision I'm making now, who has that information as of today. Does the Government have a concern about my order? Will the Government let me know about that.

MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor. My colleague, Mr. Levenson, is going to address that point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVENSON: Your Honor, I think we start from common ground, which is that the Court's suggestion is a good idea, and indeed our office has undertaken to

determine who within the chain of approvals within our office has been exposed to the name of the victim, to memorialize that information, gather it together, and also to -- also to undertake to gather also from law enforcement agents who may also have been exposed to that information.

I think, as a prudential matter, whether the All Writs Act or other authority extends to that, where we agree that it's a good idea and we are representing to the Court that we are undertaking to gather it, I think Step 1 is accomplished, and that the question of -- I think it is -- to the extent that there's a closed question about the Court's authority now, if there isn't a violation, at that point it seems to me that the Court is well situated to say, "All right, now turn it over."

So what I think makes sense in the short term rather than in -- and I spent some time last night and today trying to read up on the All Writs Act and I came away with two senses. One, I'm not an authority on the All Writs Act. Two, I'm not sure anybody is. It's truly in unchartered waters.

THE COURT: Well, the All Writs Act comes into play only if you don't agree to give me the names. And let me tell you what gives me my concern and why I think you ought to share thus far, given the Government's

interest in protecting the anonymity of the victim, um, you succeeded and as far as I know it hasn't been disclosed. But you've done better so far than others.

About a year ago, the Department of Justice made a decision not to charge Elliot Spitzer and to call him "Client Number 9" in filings that were made with the Court derived from wiretap information. If you read the New York Times, for example, March 10, 2008 and March 11, 2008, the New York Times reports that law enforcement officials were among those who didn't follow the decisions made by the Attorney General or his designee in not indicting or naming Governor Spitzer, they just put the information up. In that case, that may have been a crime because 18 United States Code Section 2511(1)(d)(1) prohibits, makes it a crime, punishable by five years in prison, to disclose information derived from a wiretap without a court order.

To my knowledge, the Department of Justice didn't investigate that. You don't want to -- you don't want that to happen. And, you know, I think I have the authority under the All Writs Act, but I've been reading about Miss Robinson in this case. I haven't been studying the All Writs Act since this occurred to me yesterday. But given your interest, I think (A) it

would be -- it would serve those interests if I had those names, and if you agreed, I should just order that the people who now have the information not disclose it except to use it in the course of some -- you know, in the course of their work. They may do some ongoing investigation. I hope you will. Because then if one of your colleagues does something that you don't want them to do, that will be a criminal contempt and they'll face the same kind of penalties that Miss Robinson faces if she violates my orders, the conditions of her supervised release.

So given the fact that the U.S. Attorney's Office has ardently arguing that confidentiality is important and given the fact that in cases before me and in even more prominent cases before other judges, that nevertheless law enforcement officials have leaked things they're not supposed to leak, I would think you'd like that kind of order.

MR. LEVENSON: I think we start from the common ground in terms of the prophylactic effort of identifying it. I think there is a difference that I think is important to consider here, a couple of differences that inform my recommendation of what amounts to a sentence, in some respects a half measure, which is to say, gather the information so that in the

event of a question about whether Miss Robinson has violated the terms of her probation, we are in a position to engage in a meaningful inquiry informed by prospectively-gathered information rather than the scramble for -- the retrospective scramble. There we're at common ground.

The concern I have, um, and I have a couple of concerns, both prudential as well as juris prudential, if you will. The juris prudential one is -- is what I see as a difficult question at best as to whether the All Writs Act authorizes orders to third parties at large. And in particular --

THE COURT: Well, no, actually I've thought about this, too. You're not a third party. You're a party.

MR. LEVENSON: Yes, the Government is a party to this action.

THE COURT: I think there are limits to how far the order can go with regard to Miss Robinson, but I assume Mr. Smith's going to represent Miss Robinson. Go ahead.

MR. LEVENSON: Okay. And I have to say that had played into my thinking of, the reality of -- the interest that -- um, if I can bring in another point of reference. I don't mean to be muddying the issue, but I

think it's a very difficult issue with no clear guidance, so I'm looking for a couple of principles.

And one point of reference was this Court's decision in connection with the earlier motion by the Press for access to the name, and the question of can the Press force the Government to turn over the name? Which raises the fact that we're dealing here with information that, on the one hand, is private, the private acts of a private individual who is obviously ashamed of shameful conduct, and on the other hand, there is the Government's interest in prosecuting the perpetrator of an extortion, which is a different issue from protecting—there's no general right of an individual to be protected from scrutiny at large.

a lot to do and I actually have an important limitation on my time this afternoon. We're going to be finished by today. You know, there may be a hybrid and we can come back to it. (A) I think if you gave me the information under seal, I wouldn't be making a decision based on it now and therefore I doubt I would be persuaded to unseal it, so the media would have more people they could go ask for it. But if you want to represent that you've collected all that information, that you'll hold it, maybe I don't even need it now,

because unless there's an alleged violation, I don't need to know the universe of people who have the information. But I could order that the people listed on the document that the U.S. Attorney is holding not disclose it except to people who need to know it to perform their professional responsibilities. And then if there's ever an issue, you'll deliver it to me and I'll decide if any of those people are in contempt of my order.

MR. LEVENSON: I think the source of authority is a little different here where there's no criminal prescription on it and I think there are probably is a source of authority for an order along those lines in the Victim Protection Act. So that may be the vehicle, rather than the All Writs Act, for getting there.

THE COURT: Well, that's why I raised it. And if -- you know, would you object to such an order? You keep the names.

MR. LEVENSON: Yeah, I don't think that's an unreasonable order.

THE COURT: In fact, it is consistent with what you're arguing about the All Writs Act. Because, as I say, so far you've done it, and that's why I've got the issues that I have, but despite the best efforts of some people, as the Spitzer case prominently suggests,

sometimes there are Government leaks. And I just think there ought to be sanctions across the board for anybody who does what you don't want done.

Okay. Now, with regard to --

MR. LEVENSON: I'm not sure I can -- I don't mean to tendentious on this point and I know you want to move on. I'm not sure I can go all the way from saying that an extortionist who is prevented from inflicting the harm that she threatened is in the same position as government officials who ought to follow the law, ought to respect the Victim Witness Act, but are not -- there's no sign of a violation now and they are already required to follow the law and to respect the law.

THE COURT: And what's going to happen if they don't, are you going to send them to the office of professional responsibility? I mean, there should be --

MR. LEVENSON: I don't know the answer now.

THE COURT: There should be a sanction. But all right.

MR. LEVENSON: So deciding that sanction now -- the only point is, deciding that sanction now may not be our best course.

THE COURT: All right. And if, you know, somebody -- if I enter the order, particularly with your agreement, and it turns out that somebody violated the

order, there are ways of challenging the lawfulness of the order. But you don't want this ever to become an issue and neither do I. I just want people to be on clear notice that they're subject to some restrictions and that they'll be consequences if they violate it.

Okay. And, Mr. Smith, you know, Miss Robinson is in a different position. I think it would be very much in her interest if I knew, now or sooner, or if you knew, now or sooner, and had a document that I could order you to produce if it ever becomes an issue as to who has this information as of today, because that would be the universe of people -- well, who has the information as of today?

MR. SMITH: Well, I know my client wants to comply with that request, your Honor, and, again, I only represent Miss Robinson and I can't speak for other individuals or other people. And I just want to acknowledge that I think she's going to comply with that order to the best of her ability and her memory, understanding that she's been in jail for six months.

THE COURT: All right. And we'll come back to this later, if we get to the sentencing phase, which I hope we will, and you hope we will. But the orders wouldn't be entirely symmetrical. I have to issue the order to her, but the condition, if I impose it, will

say that she can't publicize, meaning disclose it to anybody. You know, if she were to say it to one of her relatives and the relative said it to the Boston Globe, she would be in violation of the condition because she told her relative, even though she's not the one who told the Boston Globe. If there are already some people out there who know the name, it would help her argue, should this ever become an issue, "I didn't, after the day I was sentenced, tell him or her."

MR. SMITH: Arguably, the longer the list, the more protection she'd have in some way. Is that --

THE COURT: Well, yeah. Look, I've conducted leak investigations and it's hard to do. If this name gets out and she didn't -- and you want to persuade me that she didn't put it out, it's going to help you to be able to argue that she wasn't the only one who knew it, and the more people who knew it, the better chance you may have of keeping her out of prison as long as her defense is truthful.

MR. SMITH: I understand.

THE COURT: We'll come back to this.

MR. SMITH: Thank you.

THE COURT: But actually I think I need to put the question to you this way and it's part of the reason I raise it now and not just later, because I can't add

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Counts 2 and 3.

terms to the sentence unless you all agree with it. can reject it, but I cannot -- so what you need to tell me, or if necessary think about, is whether this term would be mutually acceptable. MR. SMITH: Between the Government and the defense? THE COURT: No. No, whether -- well, yeah, whether --MR. SMITH: We would accept it, your Honor. My client would accept it, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. And although they wouldn't be framed exactly the same way. It's not part of the sentence with regard to the Government, it's an ancillary order, which is what the All Writs Act ordinarily covers. Okay. And then the plea agreement has a waiver of right to appeal in Paragraph 7. So if Mr. Smith, I'll eventually be asking you whether you've talked with the defendant about that. It has a forfeiture provision. Is there anything else I should have in mind with regard to the plea agreement? MR. DOWDEN: The only other thing, your Honor, is, as you mentioned, it calls for the Government to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment and she would plead to

1 THE COURT: And you also are going to want me to dismiss the information? 2 3 MR. DOWDEN: Yes, to the extent it's not already dismissed. Yes, sir. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Under the relatively -- well, under the Crime Victim's Rights Act, the CVRA, 6 7 and the relatively new Federal Rule of Criminal 8 Procedure 60, the victim has a right to attend any hearing involving a plea or a sentencing, among other 9 10 things, and a right to be heard, either personally or 11 through a representative or through the Government. Was 12 the victim notified of this proceeding? 13 MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor, a victim letter 14 was sent out in the ordinary course, as the Government 15 usually does, and I understand that counsel for the 16 victim is in the courtroom today. 17 THE COURT: All right. And do you know 18 whether he wishes to be heard with regard to the plea or 19 the sentence? 20 MR. DOWDEN: I think he's reserving his right to be heard, your Honor. I don't know if he --21 22 THE COURT: Well, perhaps he could identify 23 himself if he's here. 24 MR. STERN: Good afternoon, your Honor. My 25 name is Donald K. Stern with the law firm of Cooley,

Godward and Kronish, and I do represent the victim in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. And does your client, directly or do you on his behalf, want to be heard with regard to the plea or the sentence at an appropriate time?

MR. STERN: Yes, or at least depending upon how it progresses, I would like to -- I may want to say something before your Honor makes a decision.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this.

MR. STERN: Whatever time you think is appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, there's essentially two points. The first thing I'm going to do is go through the usual Rule 11 colloquy with regard to Miss Robinson and decide whether to accept the plea, but not the plea agreement and the sentence. Do you want to be heard before I do that Rule 11 colloquy?

MR. STERN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then ordinarily I would give the victim a chance to speak before I hear from the government and the defendant about the appropriate sentence, or in this case, whether to accept it. There may be an opportunity for some flexibility here. But when we get to that point, I'll ask you again, if you

want to be heard.

MR. STERN: That's fine, your Honor. The victim does support the plea agreement, just to get to the bottom line, and I can make those comments at whatever point in the procedure is appropriate.

THE COURT: Okay. A little later.

All right. Miss Robinson should approach the witness stand. She's already been sworn. And,
Mr. Smith, ideally you would go with her with a copy of the plea agreement and the indictment.

MR. SMITH: I have those, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you, again -- do you understand that you're still under oath?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand, again, that if you intentionally give me a false answer to any question, that could be a separate prosecutable criminal offense?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if you're confused by any of my questions or unsure about what an honest or accurate answer would be, I'll let you talk to Mr. Smith so we can clear up any confusion and so you can give me a reliable response?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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                THE COURT: Have you ever been arrested or
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     convicted under any name other than the name you gave me
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     a short time ago?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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                THE COURT: What other name or names have you
     been arrested or convicted under?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Um, Michelle Wilkinson.
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                THE COURT: How old are you?
                THE DEFENDANT: Um --
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                THE COURT: I'm sorry. Mr. Smith, is there
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     something you want to discuss with her?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Um, and Michelle Garcia. I
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     have filed for divorce and I wanted to go over to my
14
     mother's maiden name. I've been notified -- I was
15
     arrested under Michelle Garcia, but I'm legally now
16
     Michelle Garcia.
17
                THE COURT: Okay. Pull that microphone a
18
     little closer to you. Try to speak into it clearly and
19
     loudly. How old are you?
20
                THE DEFENDANT:
                                29.
21
                THE COURT: How far did you go in school?
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                THE DEFENDANT: Some college. Finished high
23
     school.
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                THE COURT: Have you ever been treated for
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     mental illness or drug addiction?
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1 THE DEFENDANT: No. 2 THE COURT: Are you today under the influence 3 of any drug, medication or alcohol? 4 THE DEFENDANT: No. 5 THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the indictment with three charges against you including two 6 7 that charge you with wire fraud? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 9 THE COURT: Did you read that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 10 11 THE COURT: Did you discuss the charges with 12 Mr. Smith including what the Government would have to 13 prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict you of the 14 wire fraud charges? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with 17 Mr. Smith's work as your lawyer? 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 19 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the letter 20 dated January 6, 2009 to Mr. Smith from the Government? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Did you sign that -- we'll make 23 that Exhibit 1 with today's date. 24 Did you sign that letter on the last page on or about January 9, 2009? 25

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                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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                THE COURT: Did you read it before you signed
 3
     it?
 4
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 5
                THE COURT: Did you discuss it with Mr. Smith
     before you signed it?
 6
 7
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 8
                THE COURT: Does that letter both accurately
     and completely describe your agreement with the
 9
10
     government?
11
                THE DEFENDANT:
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                THE COURT: Has anybody made any promises to
13
     you or given you any assurances that are not in that
     letter?
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15
                THE DEFENDANT:
                                 No.
16
                THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you or
17
     tried to force you to plead guilty?
18
                THE DEFENDANT: No.
19
                THE COURT: Do you understand that this is
20
     what's called a binding plea agreement and, therefore,
     if I accept the agreement, I have to impose the sentence
21
22
     that's described in the letter, and if I don't accept
23
     the agreement, I have to tell you I'm not going to
24
     impose that sentence and give you a chance to withdraw
25
     your plea?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept the plea agreement I will sentence you to six months incarceration, to be followed by six months in home detention, as part of three years of supervised release, restitution of \$280,000, forfeiture as set forth in the plea agreement, and a \$200 mandatory special assessment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that one of the conditions of your supervised release will be that you cannot tell anybody, except your lawyer and people working with him, the name of the victim or the identity of the victim?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if you were to disclose the victim's identity, that would be a violation of that condition of your supervised release, your supervised release could be revoked, you could be locked up for up to three years, and then put on supervised release again?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that -- I've been told that, in addition to what you agreed in the letter, by Mr. Smith, that you were also agreeable to

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giving him, and if I order it, me, the names of all the
 1
 2
     people you've, up until now, told the victim's
 3
     identity?
 4
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 5
                THE COURT: And you can talk about this with
     Mr. Smith if you want. And is that acceptable to you?
 6
 7
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
8
                THE COURT: Please go over to Page 4 of that
     plea agreement. Do you see Paragraph 7 there?
 9
10
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
11
                THE COURT: Do you understand that in that
12
     Paragraph 7 you're giving up your rights to appeal and
13
     to otherwise challenge anything in this case if I give
14
     you the sentence that you agree to in this plea
15
     agreement plus the additional condition of disclosing
16
     the names of people who already know the victim's
17
     identity that I just mentioned?
18
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
19
                THE COURT: And have you discussed with
20
     Mr. Smith specifically whether you want to give up those
     rights?
21
22
                THE DEFENDANT:
                                Yes.
23
                THE COURT: And is that something you want to
24
     do?
25
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept your plea of guilty, you'll become a Federal felon and you may lose certain rights, if you have them, including the right to vote, to hold public office, to serve on a jury, and to possess a firearm?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the maximum possible penalties are as stated in Paragraph 2 of the plea agreement, that is, on each of the two counts of wire fraud, you could be sentenced to up to 20 years in prison, plus 3 years supervised release, a fine of \$250,000, and a mandatory \$100 special assessment?

THE COURT: Do you understand that supervised release means that when you get out of jail or prison you'll be under the supervision of the Probation Department on certain conditions, and if you violate any of those conditions, your supervised release can be revoked and you can be locked up again for up to three years?

> THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And then put on supervised release

again?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the

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sentencing in this case will be governed by the Advisory Guideline System that is now in effect in Federal court?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you talked with Mr. Smith about how that Advisory Guideline System might operate or apply in your case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that under that system essentially I'm required to calculate a guideline range, and in this case, because there's an agreed sentence, either decide that the agreed sentence is reasonable or reject the plea and give -- the plea agreement and give you a chance to withdraw your guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that while you've given up your rights to appeal, if I accept the agreed upon sentence, the Government still has a right to appeal?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that there's no parole in the Federal system so you'll have to serve essentially all of the time in jail that's imposed?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you still have a right, if you want to use it, to have a trial decided by a jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that in connection with a trial, you have a right to a lawyer, and if you can't afford a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed to continue to represent you at public expense?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if we had a trial, you would be presumed innocent, you would not have to prove you were innocent, rather the government would have to prove you were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to achieve your conviction?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if we had a trial, you would have an opportunity, through your lawyer, to object to the Government's evidence and challenge its witnesses?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that as part of that -- no. Do you understand that you would also have an opportunity, but not an obligation, to present a defense including compelling the attendance of witnesses

to testify and the production of documents? 1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 2 3 THE COURT: Do you understand that you would also have an opportunity, but not an obligation, to 4 5 testify yourself and if I instructed you -- well, if you decided not to testify, I would instruct the jury that 6 7 it could draw no suggestion that you were quilty from 8 your decision not to testify? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 9 10 THE COURT: Do you understand that if I accept 11 your guilty plea and then accept the plea agreement, 12 you'll be giving up your right to a trial and there will be no trial? 13 THE DEFENDANT: 14 Yes. 15 THE COURT: All right. Do you have a copy of the indictment there? 16 17 MR. SMITH: Yes, I do, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Miss Robinson, did you, indeed, read all of this indictment? 19 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 21 THE COURT: I'll like you to keep all of it in 22 mind, but I'm going to focus on Counts 2 and 3, the wire 23 fraud counts, the alleged violations of 18 United States 24 Code Section 1343. Do you understand that to prove each 25 of the charges in Counts 2 and 3, the Government would

have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, first, a scheme substantially as charged in the indictment to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses; two, that you knowingly, meaning intentionally, and willfully, knowing it was illegal, participated in the scheme with intent to defraud; and third, interstate wire communications on or about the date alleged occurred in furtherance of the scheme?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that

THE COURT: And do you understand that interstate wire communications include wire transfers of funds between financial institutions?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that a "scheme" is some plan or course of action, and to "defraud" means to deceive somebody else to get money by misrepresenting some material fact?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that a material fact is one that has a tendency to influence the person it is directed at?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, Counts 2 and 3 charge as follows, starting at Paragraph 17. It says: "On or about the date set forth below in the District of

Massachusetts and elsewhere, you, Michelle Robinson, having devised and intending to devise a scheme to defraud and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises concerning material facts for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice did transmit," and here it says "and," but it really means "or," "or cause to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, from one state to another, the following:"

Count 2 charges that on or about July 24, 2008, as part of your scheme, you caused the transfer of \$80,000 from the Mellon Bank to another branch of the Mellon Bank. Did you commit that crime?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Count 3 charges that on the same date, or on or about that date, you also caused the transfer of \$200,000 from the Mellon Bank to the Bank of America. Did you commit that crime?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, I'd like you to listen while the government summarizes what its evidence would have been if this case went to trial, and then I'm going to ask you if you agree with the government's summary of what you did.

MR. DOWDEN: Thank you, your Honor.

If this case were to proceed to trial, the government to prove the following.

Over some period of time, beginning no later than 2007, the defendant, Michelle Robinson, entered a consentual sexual relationship with BP, a married business person. BP is not an elected official, nor a public official.

At some point during her relationship with BP, Robinson recognized that BP was a successful business person who had substantial monetary assets and further recognized that public exposure of her relationship to him would subject him to reputational harm.

Beginning no later than July 22, 2008, Robinson concocted a scheme to extort money from BP by threatening to expose her relationship with him to a third-party, including to an individual she referred to as a member of the media, who she claimed offered her money to reveal her relationship with BP. As Robinson well knew, however, there was no such third-party who offered her money to reveal such relationship.

In particular, Robinson sent a series of threatening communications to BP in which she demanded money or she would expose BP. In response to Robinson's demand, BP initially paid her \$80,000 in cash. In order

to obtain and replenish the funds necessary to obtain this cash, there was an interstate wire of monies from accounts maintained by BP that was transmitted on or about July 24th, 2008.

After receiving the \$80,000 in cash, Robinson demanded more money from BP and threatened to reveal him to a member of the media she claimed was interested in this information. BP paid her \$200,000 in cash in response to those demands. Again, to obtain the funds necessary to make this payment, an interstate wire transfer of funds was executed on or about July 24th, 2008.

The Government's evidence at trial would include bank records, phone records, recorded telephone conversations and text messages as well as testimony from both civilian and law enforcement witnesses.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you agree with the Government's summary of what you did?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And how do you now wish to plead to Counts 2 and 3, guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: Then I'll -- do you want to say

25 something?

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MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor. I don't believe
 1
     the defendant was advised of the statutory maximums and
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 3
     if the Court would like to --
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                THE COURT: Yes, she was, I read her Paragraph
 5
     2 of the plea agreement.
 6
                MR. DOWDEN: Oh, I apologize then, your Honor.
 7
                THE COURT: Do you remember I read you
8
     Paragraph 2 of the plea agreement that recited the
     maximum possible penalties?
 9
10
                THE DEFENDANT: 20 years to life.
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                MR. DOWDEN: Thank you, your Honor.
12
     apologize.
13
                THE COURT: Well, I am accepting the plea, but
14
     making no decision at this moment on the plea
15
     agreement. I'm doing that, accepting the plea, because
16
     I find you are competent, you are acting knowingly and
17
     voluntarily, you are effectively represented, and
18
     there's an independent basis in fact to support your
19
     plea. You may take your seat back at the table.
20
                (Takes seat at table.)
21
                THE COURT: Now we will move to the sentencing
22
     phase of this proceeding.
23
           In connection with the sentencing, I have the
24
     presentence report, the financial statement that the
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     defendant gave to Probation, and today's February 20,
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2009 memo from Probation with copies to the parties, which I'll make part of the presentence report. revises the calculation. I also have the Government's sentencing memo, the defendant's sentencing memo, the financial affidavit provided to the Government pursuant to the plea agreement, which I have placed under seal. The defendant's submission today provided some additional information concerning the financial statement that was given to probation. I've looked at the -- let's see. I think that's Is there anything else I should have received and read relating to sentencing? MR. DOWDEN: Nothing further from the

Government, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: No, your Honor. Although, we did incorporate in the letter we sent this morning, I believe, a statement regarding somebody staying at the house that we propose she reside at. Probation had a concern. We addressed that concern by voluntarily requesting that person to move out and Probation appears satisfied. I think we wrote that in a letter to the Court.

THE COURT: Actually. (Looks.)

MR. SMITH: That should have come with the financial statement, as the cover page of the financial

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statement that we submitted this morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Yes. That's under seal. It's my understanding that if there's an operative telephone, Probation is content to have Miss Robinson reside at that address if I accept the binding plea agreement.

All right. Then, I think it's important to assure that there's a clear and common sense of the legal landscape here. We are under the Advisory Guideline System that is in effect after the Supreme Court's decisions in Kimbrough and Gall. As the Supreme Court described in Gall: "A court, a District Court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guideline range. The quidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark. The guidelines are not the only consideration, however. Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the District Judge should then consider all of the Section 3553A factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the guideline range is reasonable, he must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he decides that an outside guideline sentence is warranted, he must

consider the extent of the deviation and ensure the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance." The Supreme Court said and found it uncontroversial that "a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, the judge must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing."

Do the parties agree that that's the general framework?

MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: We are operating under the current guideline manual. This is a binding plea agreement. It's my understanding, under 6(b)(1.2)(c), that to the extent the lower the guideline sentence is regarded as a departure, I have to decide if the sentence departs for justifiable reasons. And the commentary points me to Section 3553B to determine if there are justifiable reasons. Essentially I have to determine whether this case is of a kind -- was outside the heartland that involves something in kind or degree that wasn't taken into account by the Sentencing Commission when it developed the guidelines.

Post Booker I think I'm directed to make that analysis under Section 3553A, to consider those factors and decide whether the sentence is justified. I guess I'm still in the frame of mind that I was in in 1994 when I had a binding plea agreement in the C.R. Bard case, 848 F. Supp. 287 at 288. Essentially it's my view that if the agreed sentence is the result of arm's length bargaining between capable counsel, I should accept it if it's within the range of reason. The burden of proof is on the parties to persuade me that a lower than guideline sentence is justified, is reasonable, based on the Section 3553A factors. That was discussed somewhat by the court in Nebraska and Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2nd 844 at 850.

But essentially it's my present view that I should accept the binding plea agreement and impose the agreed-upon sentence if it's within the range of what I regard as reasonable and I consider the Section 3553A factors even if it isn't the exact sentence I would select in the absence of a binding plea agreement.

Does somebody have a different view of what standard I should apply?

MR. DOWDEN: No, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Smith, let me ask you then.

Have you and Miss Robinson each read the presentence 1 2 report? 3 MR. SMITH: Yes, we have, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Is there anything in there that 5 you or she thinks is inaccurate? 6 MR. SMITH: No. Our plea agreement, we 7 conceded that this is a Level 21 offense. With the 8 revised plea agreement, it comes back with the same number, so we would agree with that. 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. Miss Robinson, did you read 11 the presentence report? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Is there anything you saw in there 14 that you think is inaccurate? 15 THE DEFENDANT: No. 16 THE COURT: Then -- there was a difference in 17 the guideline calculations between the plea agreement 18 and the presentence report. The parties calculate the 19 quidelines as 27 to 33 months. Implicit in that is that 20 they believe this is a level -- a Level 18, Criminal 21 History category 1. I think the parties used Section 22 2(B)(1.1), an intended loss of \$580,000, to get to 23 The presentence report had this at a Level 21, 24 using the same loss amount, but the cross-reference to 25 blackmail in Section 2(b)(3.3) that starts with a base

Offense Level of 9 rather than 7.

In the memo today, Probation also comes out at 18-1 with guidelines of 27 to 33 months by a different method. They continue to use the cross-reference, but they find it's impermissible to count the \$300,000 that was the subject of the last demand, but is not the subject of either of the counts.

As I said, I'm prepared to accept what the parties and Probation have found, that the guideline range is 27 to 33 months. It's an 18-1. But as I said earlier, given the nature of this case, even if it -- the guideline range is 33 to 41 months, um, that may not be material. Either your agreed-upon sentence is within the range of reason or it isn't. But since the parties and Probation are in agreement, I accept that the Total Offense Level is 18, the Criminal History Category is 1. Therefore, the Advisory Guideline Range is 27 to 33 months in prison, 24 to 36 months supervised release, a fine range of \$6,000 to 4 million dollars, restitution of \$280,000, which I understand the -- and a special assessment of \$200.

I'm told by Probation that the victim has waived his right to restitution and in that circumstance any order of restitution will be directed to the Crime Victim Fund under 3664G(2). However, I say that in part

at this time because if Mr. Stern, on behalf of the victim, has a different view as to where the restitution should go, I need to be told.

All right. Do the parties agree that I've just accurately recited the guideline ranges?

MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stern, is there something you now would like to say on behalf of the victim?

MR. STERN: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

And just to address the last point first. As your Honor pointed out, there is a provision in the Restitution Act which contemplates the victim waiving whatever rights the victim has to restitution and those funds, to the extent that they are funds down the road, be provided to the Crime Victims Fund. And so the victim is prepared to -- he would like that to be the case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STERN: Your Honor just to make a brief statement on behalf of my client.

Clearly he made some very bad decisions along the way. He very much regrets that. He regrets it on many, many different -- in many, many different ways. He

regrets in taking the time of the Court. He regrets the resources that have been used by the Government to investigate and prosecute this case. And, in fact, he regrets that Miss Robinson is now a defendant before the court.

But having in mind all the circumstances -- and I should say, by the way, that he appreciates the efforts of all involved in coming to this plea agreement, the efforts on the part of the Government to promptly and thoroughly investigate this case. It was candidly at my urging, when he came to me, that I thought the only course of action that was responsible and appropriate was to bring this to the attention of law enforcement authorities. But both the Government and defense counsel, I think, have engaged in good faith discussions and reached, I think, a reasonable resolution.

It's as your Honor alluded to, it may not be perfect, and it may not be the one that the Court independently, absent the plea agreement being presented, might have arrived at at its own, but I think it's a resolution which takes account of the particular circumstances of the case, one which seeks to avoid the very result threatened by the crime that's been charged and now it's the one which the defendant plead guilty. As the Court noted in an earlier opinion in this case,

that's the very harm that the prosecution seeks to punish here. And it also takes account of the fact that the Court and the criminal justice system ought to be avoiding harm to victims where it's reasonable to do so and where it's possible.

You know, I've been doing this long enough, and I know your Honor has, to remember that there was a time that the Government and the courts, for that matter, really didn't care what victims thought, really didn't care the position that victims had. And I'm pleased to say that actually this district, the District of Massachusetts and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the state courts, have really been in the forefront of protecting the rights of victims for 20, 25, 30 years.

So the crime -- the victims Rights Act really was not, in my view, directed to the District of

Massachusetts or to a sister judicial system on the state side, because I think that this system and the Commonwealth have been doing this for a long time. But when Congress passed the bill in 2006, it was designed to really send a message nationwide that the rights of the victim, including the privacy, legitimate privacy rights of the victim, do matter. So victims do have rights and they're not just, as your Honor noted in your opinion, they're not just aspirational rights, they're

real rights, and they're designed to protect the dignity and privacy.

THE COURT: Well, they almost became constitutional rights. Until recently I served on the National Advisory Committee on criminal rules, which had the responsibility of implementing the Crime Victim Rights Act resulting in Rule 60, which isn't even yet in our books. But there is a very strong nationwide movement to give considerably more protection to victims including, as you say, their privacy in appropriate circumstances. And there was a serious effort to get Congress to vote a constitutional amendment that would enshrine those interests, protection for those interests in the Constitution.

But instead of proceeding in that fashion,

Congress passed the Crime Victims Rights Act, you know,
which is part of the reason you get to speak here
today. But, you know, it is a law that, you know,
reflects the perception that, particularly at
sentencing, but not just at sentencing, it shouldn't
just be the Government and the defendant who are
considered, but if there's a victim, an identifiable
victim, that person's interests should be considered and
he, individually or through a representative, is
entitled to have a voice so the judge can make a more

fully informed decision.

MR. STERN: And I think, in this case, your Honor, and I'll conclude on this, I do think this strikes the right balance. Again, it's not perfect, but it does -- as the Government has pointed out, I think it does send a deterrent message. I think it does encourage other persons in positions like this who, for whatever reason, including some bad decision on their part, to come forward to appropriate authorities if need be. And I think it also provides with a significant period of supervised release, you know, some real services to the defendant. And I sincerely hope that the Probation Department is in a position to provide those services.

THE COURT: Well, they're in a position to provide them. What you should sincerely hope is that she's smart enough to take advantage of it if I accept this sentence. Okay. Thank you, very much.

MR. STERN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The Government should remind me, although I think I have it vividly in mind, the sentence it advocates and particularly why it regards it as reasonable. And I have some -- the written submission was very helpful. It's what I usually get in a more familiar case and I certainly

wanted it in this case. But I actually have perhaps two related points that haven't been addressed by anybody and I'll raise them at the appropriate time.

Mr. Dowden.

MR. DOWDEN: Thank you, your Honor. At the outset, I'd like to remind the Court that the Government's recommendation includes a 6-month period of incarceration, a 6-month period of home detention, a 3-year period of supervised release, during which time she may not publicize or tell anyone the name of the victim, as the Court has explained, the mandatory restitution as required in the Crime Victims Rights Act, which I understand the victim is assigning to the Crime Victims Fund, and a \$200 special assessment. And the Government is not seeking a fine in this case.

Your Honor, as the Government outlined in its sentencing memo, the totality of the components of the Government's sentence is reasonable. It is reasonable because it is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to effectuate the purposes of sentencing with respect to this particular defendant and the offense in which she engaged.

To be sure, as we mentioned in our memo, the incarcerated period of time of this sentence is low. It is low. And candidly the Court knows the Government

usually recommends sentences that are higher. But it has in the past and will continue to argue, in some cases, that there should be a variance. And the Government believes the totality of the confinement period in this case, that is, 12 months, 6 months incarceration, 6 months home detention, when combined with the extended period of supervised release, is reasonable. And the Government has a number of reasons.

The first is, the core of Ms. Robinson's conduct is the extortion and threat here. And Congress -- the extortion and threat to injure the reputation of this victim.

THE COURT: Well, you say, in the indictment, his business as well.

MR. DOWDEN: His business as well, your Honor.

The Government did not charge Hobbs Act extortion in this case. The government --

THE COURT: And, in fact, I studied with the Probation Department whether that charge would have enhanced the sentence, and the guidelines would have been the same. But so I didn't raise the issue with you why it wasn't a Hobbs Act extortion, because I think it could have been.

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, besides the Government's charging decision with respect to Hobbs Act extortion, the Government believes that the charger did choose, which specifically referenced the reputation of this victim, is what goes to the core of his conduct. And Congress has made a determination with respect to that specific conduct that a two-year statutory maximum is the appropriate sentence. Although the guidelines may be higher, Congress has made a determination that 24 months is sufficient.

And I think the Court has to look at this conduct along a continuum within that range. There is no threat of violence here, although it was serious conduct, and repeated conduct --

THE COURT: Well, you know, in blackmail, usually there is no threat of violence. This -- well, go ahead.

MR. DOWDEN: Yes.

THE COURT: But, I mean, this is blackmail.

This isn't, you know, "I'm going to break your leg if

you don't pay your debt," but it's threatening a kind of

pain that can be greater than a broken leg. Well, go

ahead.

MR. DOWDEN: The Government recognizes that, your Honor. But the Government also believes that the

3-year period of supervised release in this sentence, which is at the maximum of -- I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DOWDEN: The 3-year period of supervised release, when taken in connection with those other components, makes this sentence reasonable. That is a significant restriction.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this something before you get to that, which is an argument I think I understand.

But what you haven't addressed is the following and that is, you know, what's the evidence of whether or not Miss Robinson was the mastermind of this extortionate scheme and where did the money go? Because she got \$280,000 at the end of July, she was arrested three years later, and she comes before me representing that she's indigent. I know that there's been the -- there's been interest in the missing man here, but I'm not sure that the most important missing man is the victim.

There are men -- well, there's one man mentioned in the presentence report as her pimp. It's ambiguous as to whether he was the pimp until 2006 or remained the pimp until August of 2008. That's the ambiguity that's created by Paragraph 69 and 95, and not until I got your

financial statement at about 11:30 this morning did I see that in the weeks after she got this money from the victim, she gave substantial amounts to two other males. And I think it's highly relevant to whether I'm going to accept this sentence. So I want to put you both on notice, so you can address it.

Either she still has this -- a meaningful amount of that money, in which case, you know, she lied to get a CJA counsel and this sentence is unreasonable, or she was acting at least in concert with and arguably at the direction of somebody else. And if she was acting at the direct of somebody else, I think the Government has got a responsibility to find out who else and prosecute the more culpable person.

But this gives her, not a pass, but a diminished role in the offense because an abused woman working as a prostitute at the behest of a man, perhaps a pimp, um, you know, might reasonably be regarded as less culpable than somebody who's a free agent and cooking up this scheme, executing this scheme on her own.

MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor. And the Government certainly factored that decision -- factored it in in agreeing to this plea agreement.

THE COURT: Well, why didn't you tell me -MR. DOWDEN: The defendant should not benefit,

clearly, from \$280,000 that was paid in this case. And without commenting on ongoing investigative efforts, the Government has an interest in making sure that there is not an organized effort here and that there are no other defendants here at this point. The Government is --

THE COURT: Well, is there an ongoing investigation?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, we normally don't comment on that for several important reasons, important reasons that individuals who might think that we may be coming will wait for us. And so we don't wish to comment on that at this point.

THE COURT: Well, I still have the question that I asked you. Is it the Government's view that she was the mastermind and, you know, intended sole beneficiary of this scheme?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, the evidence that's been developed to date suggests that there was not a coordinated effort between Miss Robinson and other individuals to execute this scheme. The Government has made efforts, frankly, to find the money in this case.

THE COURT: Did you go to the safe deposit box?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ DOWDEN: Your Honor, there was a search warrant that was executed on this safe deposit box

1 earlier in this year. THE COURT: And -- I'm not going to mention 2 3 these names of these people for a combination of 4 reasons, but if you go to Paragraph 52 of the financial 5 statement you gave me this morning that's under seal? 6 MR. DOWDEN: Yes. 7 THE COURT: There's somebody that had been 8 identified, "apparent business," last name "unknown," who allegedly or reportedly got \$20,000? 9 10 MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, frankly, without 11 commenting on personal and private information, the 12 Government understands what the purpose of that was. Ιt 13 was an expense for Miss Robinson's personal benefit. Ιt was not another individual. 14 15 THE COURT: And what about on the next page, 16 the \$40,000? 17 MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, the Government has 18 and continues to follow that lead. 19 THE COURT: Because -- and then if you go up 20 to 49, some of the money was said to have been spent on

to 49, some of the money was said to have been spent on a friend's Land Rover. Wasn't she in a Land Rover when she was arrested?

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MR. DOWDEN: Yes, your Honor, she was.

THE COURT: And so this is \$13,000 for custom rims on two cars, a BMW and a Land Rover. My children

would tell me she was pimping their wheels, my law clerks tell me that. Do you know who the friend is?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, we're in the process of identifying the registration for that vehicle and the owners of that vehicle, yes.

THE COURT: Well, if she was contrite, she could voluntarily tell you who the friend is and if she's not contrite, you could stick her in the grand jury you can ask her when she's sentenced. These things are ascertainable.

Because to me, this really goes to the reasonableness of the sentence. If, you know, if she's a person who was abused from childhood and now is on the -- under the influence of some men who are taking advantage of her, you know, that might cause the agreed-upon sentence to be reasonable or reinforce the reasonableness. You know, on the other hand, if she cooked up this scheme on her own and enthusiastically executed it, maybe the sentence is not enough. And, you know, you say you thought about it, but there's no mention of this in the submissions made.

MR. DOWDEN: Because of the personal nature of some of these issues, the fact that some of these items that are listed in the financial statement were for her personal benefit, the fact that also some of these

items, quite frankly, there is evidence to suggest were frankly stolen from her.

Your Honor, would you like me to continue or -THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, I will not go on at great length because I believe Mr. Stern has gone on at great length about the victim consideration in this case, and we said in our memo, that is not indeed significant, impacting significant consideration for the Government's calculation. The Government has statutory obligations in this matter to respect the dignity, the privacy of the victim as well as to prevent further harm to that victim from the defendant. That goes to the heart of the restriction that has been placed on her on supervised release.

Your Honor, referring to deterrence, the government takes that message very, very seriously. And as we outlined in our memo, the general deterrence of this message in this sentence is very important. Extortion preys on fear and preys on fear for individuals, fear for their families, and in too many cases victims succumb to that fear, pay that money, or, in fact, go to self-help and the Government does not want to promote that. And it's sending a message that the Government takes extortion seriously, takes the

victim's rights not to have the very fear that was supposed to be caused on them come to fruition, very seriously. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, I just want to make sure that I'm clear. I asked you whether you thought she was acting alone and was the mastermind of this scheme or whether, I mean, there's an escort service whose name you have. It's in here. Do you know who the escort service is?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm not asking you to tell me.

I'm just asking you if you know?

MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, there does not appear, based on what we know today, that the escort service was significantly involved in the execution of this scheme. There may have been another individual who was involved in this scheme. And that, without commenting any further, is subject to inquiry.

THE COURT: "May have been." Well, Miss Robinson knows.

And just to make sure I've got this clearly in mind, I think -- it's not part of the sentence, but the ancillary order or the agreement of the Government is going to require that the U.S. Attorney's Office collect in writing the names of everyone who -- employed by the

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Government who knows the victim's identity.
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     Mr. Levenson can hold that for the Government. I'll
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     issue an order that everybody on that list use -- you
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     know, to maintain the confidentiality of it and only use
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     it in connection with his or her responsibilities in
     this case or any investigation arising out of this
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     case. And hopefully I'll never have to look at that
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     list if I impose the sentence. Okay?
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                MR. DOWDEN: Your Honor, just two other
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              Just the mechanics of that, your Honor, and
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     I'll let my colleague address that in more detail.
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                THE COURT: We'll deal with that later. If I
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     issue an order and you want it refined in some way, you
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     can ask me and I'll seriously consider it.
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                MR. DOWDEN: To the extent that there are
     individuals associated with the defendant, that would be
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     separately filed with the Court, their submission, I
     understand, your Honor?
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                THE COURT: I guess I'll take that up with
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     Mr. Smith, whether he'll hold it or file it with me.
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     might just rely on him to hold it.
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           All right. Mr. Smith, what you filed this morning
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     was helpful, too, but you now know I -- as I say, I
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     think the -- I don't know whether there's a missing
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     person here that would give me a more accurate
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perspective whether -- well, of your client's role in the offense and whether this sentence is reasonable.

MR. SMITH: Well, I'll address it. I believe the sentence is reasonable, your Honor, and we agree with the Government that the guidelines don't really fully address my client's individual situation, that a variance is appropriate, and a sufficient sentence is what's been recommended by the parties.

And obviously if we turn to the 3553A factors, which we've outlined in our brief, we start with my client's background, which you're now familiar with, with the PSR, as a child. She was raised by parents that both battled substance abuse problems and she faced significant physical abuse in the home. As a result, twice in her young childhood she was removed from the home by state authorities. She returned to the home as a child only then to endure homelessness with her family. And as a result she suffered from dire financial and economic circumstances resulting in her turning to prostitution as a teenager. And as it was found out through the PSR, she disclosed to the Probation Officer, that at 15 was her first exposure and experience in that.

THE COURT: Could you take the microphone and speak into it, please.

MR. SMITH: Yes, your Honor.

(Gets microphone.)

MR. SMITH: As I was saying, at 15, my client, she ran away from home, she did enter into the world of prostitution for a period of her time. She was able to extricate herself only to find herself at the age of 20 as a single mother with a young child whose husband was gone. And, again, then, at that point in time, she turned back to prostitution, which has been, unfortunately, really a terrible concept as a result of the dire circumstances that she found herself growing up in.

Obviously she engaged in illegal conduct.

Obviously she had to support her child. She did the best she possibly could, your Honor. And until the circumstance leading up to this arrest, she had not been convicted of a crime and she had not been incarcerated. And she hadn't served any time until about the 13th of August when she was arrested.

And I think, your Honor, to address the deterrent effect, um, we did some research to look into for the Court to see if there are similar cases and we found none in Massachusetts. And my client, should the Court impose this sentence, will have spent one year in incarceration, essentially. She'll have lost her home,

she'll have lost custody of her daughter, which is now in temporary custody of a relative. She's lost everything she's owned. And the equivalent of economic capital punishment comes to mind when you realize, yes, she is a young mother, she was struggling, she made a mistake, she acknowledged her mistake, she came forward and filled out a financial --

THE COURT: She didn't just quite make a mistake, she committed a very serious crime. I mean, extortion has long been regarded as a serious crime. Not every prostitute resorts to extortion.

MR. SMITH: We agree with the Court on that, this is a very serious crime, your Honor, and she acknowledged and accepted the responsibility, and she's lost virtually everything she's had. She didn't have much, but she's lost virtually everything she's had as a result of her acceptance of the responsibility.

Clearly she stands as a deterrent effect on anybody else who might consider this kind of conduct. Clearly she's been punished by serving a year in jail, having three years of supervised release, where she's going to have to report and live by all the rules imposed by the court.

Also, there's a rehabilitative possibility by following the rules laid down by the Probation Officer

in supervised release, there's a possibility she could obtain some kind of occupational training and be rehabilitated, your Honor. She's only 27 years old. She has a very young child.

I mean, for all these reasons, that the sentence imposed by the Court is sufficient but not greater than necessary.

THE COURT: Well, I guess I have a series of related questions. As I said, if you look at the presentence report, there's an ambiguity. Take a look at Paragraph 69 and 95. 69 suggests that she hadn't identified the person as a pimp until 2006 and --

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, could we approach for a moment on that particular point?

THE COURT: We can. And, in fact, you know, if there's anything I should be told in the lobby or at the side bar, that's fine. You know, some of this could affect an ongoing investigation, if there is one, some of this could affect his privacy interests, but it's also related to the decision I need to make and it shouldn't be discussed in open court. So we'll have a brief closure of the court. But I'll see you at side bar.

(In open court.)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, let me do the following. If I accept this plea agreement, am I correct in understanding that it's consistent with the plea agreement to make the home detention on electronic monitoring?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And it will probably take at least a day and maybe a little more to set that up, if there's an operative telephone at the location that you propose she reside. Do you know whether there is yet an operative telephone?

MR. SMITH: There is. I have the phone number right here, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, you'll give it to Probation if I accept the sentence, but it would require the preparation of a judgment. As a practical matter, Miss Robinson wouldn't get out until next week and until that place, that phone can be dealt with. Is that consistent with the agreement? Because I can also continue the sentencing.

MR. SMITH: No, I think we would be willing to agree to whatever the Court -- if the Court were going to impose a sentence, we would agree to those conditions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, is there any more that you would like to say?

MR. SMITH: No, your Honor. Thank you for your courtesy. And I would like to thank Probation for promptly completing the PSR in a way that could expedite the sentencing proceeding today.

THE COURT: They worked very hard and did very well.

Miss Robinson, you know have an opportunity, but not an obligation to speak before I decide whether to accept this sentence, and I haven't decided yet. But that means you don't have to say anything, if you don't want to, but if there's something you would like to say, for me to consider, now is the time.

THE DEFENDANT: Um, I just want to apologize to the Court and to the victim, that I feel really horrible.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

THE DEFENDANT: I just want to apologize to the Court and to the victim. I feel really horrible and I'm really sorry for what I did. And I have no intentions of discussing this case with anybody.

THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated.

I'm going to take about a 10-minute break and then
I will return and tell you whether I'm accepting the

plea agreement. The Court is in recess.

(Recess 4:20 p.m.)

(Resume 4:35 p.m.)

THE COURT: Having had the opportunity to consider this matter intensely and carefully and for the reasons I'll describe, I do hereby accept the binding plea agreement. Count 1 of the indictment in the information is therefore dismissed.

I find that the agreed sentence is reasonable. It is the result of arm's length negotiation by capable, experienced counsel. It is within the range of reason when all of the Section 3553A and B factors are considered.

I think even before **Booker**, this could have properly been viewed as a justified departure. The agreed-upon sentence requires that Miss Robinson spend a year in custody, 6 months in jail, already served, and 6 months in home confinement. The sentencing guideline expressly recognizes that in certain circumstances a day in home confinement can be properly exchanged for a day in jail or prison.

This sentence, agreed upon by the parties, is 15 months below the bottom of the Advisory Guideline range, however, this case is not in the heartland of cases considered by the Sentencing Commission in developing

the guidelines. Consideration of the Section 3553A factors, as I'll explain, persuades me that this sentence is sufficient and no more than necessary to serve the statutory goals of sentencing.

I have, as required by the statute, considered the nature and circumstances of the offense. It shouldn't be lost that extortion is a very serious crime, a crime that would ordinarily be properly punished by a considerably higher sentence than the sentence imposed today. However -- although nobody, particularly Miss Robinson, wants to say so, I infer that she was not a totally free agent in this matter.

She has a history of being an abused woman. She first became a prostitute when she was 15. She is a person with a history of being taken advantage of by men who profited from her prostitution. I infer that she's not the only person morally culpable in this case, in this crime, and perhaps, although further investigation will be necessary to say with certainty, she's less culpable than others who -- or at least one other, involved in the extortion. I'm not talking about the victim, I'm talking about one or more other individuals.

As required by Section 3553A, I've considered Ms. Robinson's characteristics. As I said, she had a difficult life. She's been abused. She's been

homeless. But she's also made a number of efforts to get an education. And she's lost the custody of her daughter as a result of this. She tried to go to college and the fact that her boyfriend was storing marijuana in her dorm room got her thrown out of college. It seems to be part of a pattern.

I find that the one year in custody adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense. It should send the message to Miss Robinson to stop committing crimes, including prostitution. If you engage in prostitution, it's a violation of state law, it's a violation of your conditions of supervised release, you can be locked up again for 3 years, in this case, if you return to prostitution. But you should particularly avoid even more serious crimes like extortion. You're going to get caught, you're going to get convicted, and you're going to get even more seriously punished.

I also think that this sentence, which involves a year in custody, should send the message to others that they should resist any temptation to extort money.

The Crime Victims Reform Act, as I said earlier, is a relatively recently enacted statute. It requires that victims' dignity and privacy be respected. The plea agreement that I've accepted eliminates the need for a trial that would have inevitably disclosed the

identity of the victim of the extortion. That disclosure is precisely the harm that Miss Robinson was threatening to inflict on the victim.

In hiring a prostitute, which itself was illegal, the victim assumed the risk that he might be caught in an investigation of prostitution and his illegal conduct might have been lawfully disclosed by law enforcement. However, engaging a prostitute or by engaging a prostitute, he didn't authorize or justify the extortion that occurred here.

While that business person created his own vulnerability, he is nevertheless a victim and he has a right recognized by that statute, the Crime Victims Rights Act, to have his privacy interest given weight in this case.

As the Government argues, the sentence I will be imposing punishes the defendant while maintaining the confidentiality of the victim and therefore should have the effect of deterring extortion by prostitutes and others and if necessary promote the likelihood that they'll be caught and convicted by encouraging other victims to inform law enforcement when extortion has occurred. This is in the public interest.

The sentence will also give the defendant a chance for a healthier and safer life. When you get out, you

won't be alone. The Probation Department will be your partner. They will help you get treatment for any mental health or drug addiction problems you may have. They will help you get an education, which at various times, you've tried to get. They'll help you find a job. They'll help you find a way to live a life where you don't have to work as a prostitute.

And if you're in danger from anybody else, you should tell your Probation Officer and your lawyer and they'll help protect you from that danger. You can get restraining orders, you can get anybody who is menacing to you illegally prosecuted.

I find that the sentence agreed upon and being imposed will not cause unwarranted disparity. As I said, Miss Robinson's case is not in the heartland of wire frauds or extortions. It doesn't fit the paradigm the Sentencing Commission had in mind when it generated the guidelines. It is a different sentence, but it's a justified different sentence than the guidelines contemplated.

So I find that one year in custody and the requirement that Miss Robinson, while on supervised release, not disclose the name of the victim to anybody, constitutes a reasonable sentence and I will impose it.

But as I'll explain, if she violates any of the

conditions of her supervised release, including by disclosing the identity of the victim in this case, she should expect to be brought back in front of me, have her supervised release revoked, be locked up for up to 3 years, and then be placed on supervised release again, where if she violates any of the conditions, she's going to be locked up for that full period of supervised release, too.

Miss Robinson, please stand.

(Defendant stands.)

THE COURT: In connection with the two counts to which you've plead guilty, I hereby sentence you to time served, plus 5 days, which is consistent -- which means you're going to be released next Wednesday and possibly sooner. But it's essential that Probation determine that you have a suitable place to live and that the electronic monitoring be set up.

So basically, to articulate it this way, I'm accepting the binding plea agreement, effective February 25, 2009, because by that time I will have signed a judgment that will permit the Federal officials to release you and you'll have in writing what you have to do.

I'm imposing a term of 3 years supervised release, the first 6 months on electronic in-home detention on

electronic monitoring. That means you'll be allowed to leave only when Probation permits it. And if it turns out that you obey the conditions and you're in school or have other responsibilities, Probation can come back to me and ask me to take the electronic monitor off. But basically you're only going to be able to go out when Probation permits you to go out on those 6 months.

You're to be home, except when authorized by Probation, or for a true medical emergency.

As a condition of your supervised release, you may not disclose the name of the victim in this case to anybody except your attorney and those working with them in connection with this case. They may use that information solely for the purpose of this case.

I'm ordering that by February 25th, Mr. Smith get from you the name -- in writing, the name of every person, to your knowledge, who knows the name of the victim in this case. And he's to file an affidavit stating that he has that list and that he'll keep it until at least your supervised release has ended.

Your supervised release is also on the following conditions. There are standard conditions. You can't commit another Federal, state or local crime. You may not unlawfully use a controlled substance, that is, a controlled substance without a prescription. You can be

tested up to 104 times a year to see if you're using drugs. You shall participate in any mental health or drug treatment program prescribed by Probation. And if you have the money or insurance, you have to pay or contribute to the cost of that. You have to submit to the collection of a DNA sample. You may not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon.

I'm not imposing a fine because there's no fine cited for in the plea agreement. However, there is a mandatory \$200 special assessment. As far as I know, the forfeiture prescribed by Paragraph 9 of the plea agreement is in effect, it's part of the sentence, and you have to forfeit the property as stated in the plea agreement. So if you have any more of that money that you extorted, it has to be returned.

To some extent I've already explained the -- I'm sorry. There's restitution of \$280,000 that shall be made to the Crime Victims Fund pursuant to 18 United States Code, Section 3664G(2), because the victim has waived his right to get his money back. And under your plea agreement, since I've imposed the agreed-upon sentence, you have waived your rights to appeal or collaterally challenge this decision, except if there's some favorable decisions to you which have retroactive effect.

Essentially the reasons for this sentence, as I said, were described earlier, but they're as follows. What shouldn't be lost here is you committed a very serious crime and it could have resulted in your going to prison for years. A sentence has to be imposed to, in effect, teach you a lesson and it has to be sufficient to try to teach other people who might be tempted to extort money from people who put themselves into jeopardy of being extorted from doing that. But the sentence also recognizes that you're still a relatively young person, that you had hardship in your life, that there have been times when people have taken advantage of you, and this may be one of them, and that there's hope for you, if you take advantage of this opportunity.

Right now you probably feel that this case has been a really miserable experience and I'm sure that it has. I expect that losing custody of your child has been painful, among other things. But if you're -- if you've learned anything from all of this, this case could turn out to be the best thing that ever happened to you, because you were living a miserable life. You were going to get into trouble, if you didn't get killed, or seriously hurt, the way you were going.

And as I said earlier, I was struck when I read

the presentence report and saw all of the efforts that you had initiated at various times to get an education, because I know a lot of people with your background don't do that or can't do that. But if that's still of interest to you, this case is going to have broken your connection with that miserable past, given you a partner in the Probation Department that will help you get on a path towards a lawful, productive, happier future. It's ultimately up to you.

You don't want to see me again, because if you're back here, you're probably just stopping in the courthouse on your way to prison for 3 years. It's very important to you that the victim's name not get out, that you not use drugs, that you not do anything that would be a violation of your conditions of supervised release. If you succeed in doing all that and you take advantage of the partners you have in the Probation Department, your future is going to be a lot happier than your past. But ultimately that's up to you. You may be seated.

(Defendant is seated.)

THE COURT: This isn't part of the sentence, but I think we believe we've agreed it's appropriate and at the beginning of next week I'll issue something in writing on this, but I am ordering the Government to

collect, in writing, the names of everybody employed in the United States Attorney's Office, the FBI, and if there's anybody else in any other office or agency, who knows the victim's identity. I'm ordering that

Mr. Levenson, or his successor, maintain that list. I'm ordering that the victim's identity be used by those employees of the Government who have a need to know it only for the purposes of this case or any investigation or prosecution arising out of this case.

It may be that additional people will have a legitimate need to know the victim's identity, but those people will have to go on Mr. Levenson's list and will have to understand that they're subject to this order. I may issue a form that they can sign saying that they've read the order and they understand that if they violate it, they can be subject to criminal contempt. That the Government has made serious and apparently, thus far, successful efforts to meet its responsibilities under the Victim Rights Act and it's just very important that that effort and that success continue.

As I said, Count 1 is dismissed and the information is also dismissed.

Is there anything further in this matter for today?

MR. DOWDEN: Nothing from the Government, your Honor.

MR. SMITH: I would just ask if our side bar conference could be sealed, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. If the transcript is prepared, the side bar conference, pursuant to standard procedures, will be transcribed separately and placed under seal.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. And the other inquiry we had, your Honor, is if my client were allowed to regain custody of her daughter during the time of home confinement, there wouldn't be any prohibition from the Court of the daughter living with her at the apartment?

and this is just going to have to be worked out with Probation. If she's a single person living alone, she can go out with the authorization of Probation. If she's got a chance to look for education or employment, I want her to do it, I don't want her to sit there for 6 months and then start doing it. If she gets her daughter and the requirements of taking care of her daughter make the electronic monitoring not feasible, if she's performed well on the electronic monitoring, Probation can come back to me and ask me to take her off the electronic monitoring. The proverbial ball is in

her court.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. We have nothing further, your Honor.

PROBATION OFFICER: Excuse me, your Honor.

There are other -- some suggested special conditions in our recommendation dealing with the collection of the restitution payments.

THE COURT: Okay, actually, that's a good point. I thought because there was no fine, those weren't necessary, but I appreciate you bringing those to my attention.

The restitution is to be paid on a schedule that the Court will order even though there's no fine. Probation will propose a schedule after they talk to you. As long as you owe any amount of restitution, you may not incur any new credit charges or open any additional lines of credit without the approval of the Probation Office. You must provide the Probation Office access to any requested financial information, which it may share with the U.S. Attorney's Office.

And I think that's it?

PROBATION OFFICER: That's all, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. You all did a highly professional job. It facilitates the administration of justice when you do that.

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The Court is in recess.
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                (Ends, 5:05 p.m.)
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                      CERTIFICATE
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       I, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do
    hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and
 7
    accurate transcription of my stenographic notes on
    Friday, February 20, 2009, before Chief Judge Mark L.
    Wolf, to the best of my skill and ability.
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11 /s/ Richard H. Romanow
     RICHARD H. ROMANOW
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